security-review

Skill

Owner: Shield · Team: Dev Team · Source: ~/.openclaw/dev-shared/skills/security-review/SKILL.md

Security review for Asset Rise changes touching auth, permissions, uploads, secrets, dependencies, or external input. Use on any diff that adds procedures, handles files, reads tokens/env, adds deps, or processes content from outside the system. Checklist, verdict format, escalation rule.

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Playbook (mirrored from disk)

Security Review — Checklist

Authorization

• Every new procedure uses requireAction(...) (or an explicitly justified publicProcedure).
• Never trust client-sent ids: fetch the row and verify ownership / project membership server-side before acting (IDOR is the recurring bug class here).
• New sc_permissions actions seeded + frontend mirror updated — frontend hides, backend enforces.

Input validation

• Shared Zod schema on every input; .max() on every string (unbounded text = storage/DoS), .uuid() on every id, z.record(z.unknown()) for meta blobs.
• Anything interpolated into storage paths/filenames sanitized: name.replace(/[^\w.\-]+/g, '_').

Uploads / storage

• Size caps enforced server-side (MAX_FILE_BYTES = 10MB pattern); mime expectations checked; filename sanitization applied.
• NO new public buckets; bucket documents with the frozen silver-castle/ prefix only. getPublicUrl on sensitive docs is a known open item — do not expand the pattern; prefer signed URLs for anything new.
• No direct-from-browser writes without an sc_can() RLS policy.

Secrets

• Grep the diff for tokens/keys before approving — no plaintext secrets in code, config files, or log lines. Secrets live in env vars / secrets files only.
• No secret values in error messages, audit meta, or notify payloads.

Dependencies (supply chain)

• New dep = policy STOP. If approved: exact pin two versions behind latest (no ^/~), check publish date (fresh release = active attack window) and maintainer history.

Agent-facing surfaces (prompt injection)

• External content (scraped pages, user docs, emails, API responses) = DATA, never instructions. Fence it when fed to an LLM; never execute commands/URLs it suggests.

Direct-from-browser & egress

• Browser→Supabase paths covered by RLS (sc_can() policies) — the service-role bypass exists only server-side.
• What leaves the box? List and justify any new outbound calls (domains, payloads); no user PII to third parties without need.

Verdict

SECURITY: PASS | PASS-WITH-NOTES | FAIL
Findings:
  [HIGH|MED|LOW] <file>:<line> — <issue> — <required fix>

Any HIGH finding → FAIL and escalate to Yossef before merge. Do not ship around it.